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Appendix A: Derivation of LAbstract
Discretionary monetary policy produces a dynamic loss in the New
Keynesian model in the presence of cost-push shocks. The possibility to
commit to a speci¯c policy rule can increase welfare. A number of authors
since Woodford (1999) have argued in favour of a timeless perspective
rule as an optimal policy. The short-run costs associated with the time-
less perspective are neglected in general, however. Rigid prices, relatively
impatient households, a high preference of policy makers for output stabil-
isation and a deviation from the steady state all worsen the performance
of the timeless perspective rule and can make it inferior to discretion.
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January 2007Non-technical summary
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that rule-based policy-making can increase
welfare. The timeless perspective proposed by Woodford (1999) represents a
prominent modern form of such a rule in monetary policy analysis. It helps to
overcome not only the traditional in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon
(1983), but also the stabilisation bias, a dynamic loss stemming from cost-push
shocks in the New Keynesian model as described in Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler
(1999). These represent the long-run gains from rule-based policy-making in the
New Keynesian model.
The timeless perspective, however, is associated with short-run costs because the
monetary authority demonstrates its commitment to the timeless perspective by
not exploiting given in°ation expectations in the initial period. Instead, it follows
a policy \to which it would have been optimal to commit to at a date far in the
past", i.e. it behaves as if the policy rule had been in place already for a long time.
This policy is strategically coherent because it avoids any initial period e®ects
that are one reason for the time inconsistency of standard commitment solutions,
but it is initially suboptimal. These short-run costs from the timeless perspective
are the price to pay to make the commitment to it arguably more credible than an
overall optimal commitment solution that exploits given in°ation expectations.
This paper analyses under which circumstances these short-run costs exceed the
long-run gains from commitment.
After deriving a formal condition for the superiority of discretion over the time-
less perspective rule, we investigate the in°uence of structural and preference
parameters on the performance of monetary policy both under discretion and the
timeless perspective. Discretion gains relatively to the timeless perspective rule,
i.e. the short-run losses become relatively more important, if the private sector
behaves less forward-looking or if the monetary authority puts a greater weight
on output gap stabilisation. For empirically reasonable values of price stickiness,
the relative gain from discretion rises with stickier prices. A fourth parameter
which in°uences the relative gains is the persistence of shocks: Introducing serial
correlation into the model only strengthens the respective relative performance
of policies in the situation without serial correlation in shocks. In particular,
we show conditions for each parameter under which discretion performs strictly
better than the timeless perspective rule.
Furthermore, the framework of short-run losses and long-run gains also allows
explaining why an economy that is su±ciently far away from its steady-state
su®ers rather than gains from implementing the timeless perspective rule. In
general, this paper uses unconditional expectations of the loss function as welfare
criterion, in line with most of the literature. The analysis of initial conditions,
however, requires reverting to expected losses conditional on the initial state of
5
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treat the economy's initial conditions as stochastic. Altogether, in the normal
New Keynesian model all conditions for the superiority of discretion need not be
as adverse as one might suspect.
Finally, we introduce an \optimal" timeless policy rule based on Blake (2001),
Jensen and McCallum (2002) and Jensen (2003). While the general in°uence
of structural and preferences parameters on the performance of monetary policy
under this rule is not a®ected, discretion is never better than this rule when
evaluated with unconditional expectations as it is common in the literature on
monetary policy rules. The reason is that this allegedly optimal rule optimally
accounts for the use of unconditional expectations as the welfare criterion. For
any timeless rule, however, initial conditions can be su±ciently adverse to make
the rule inferior to discretion.
As a policy conclusion, the timeless perspective in its standard formulation is not
optimal for all economies at all times. In particular, if an economy is characterised
by rigid prices, a low discount factor, a high preference for output stabilisation or
a su±ciently large deviation from its steady state, it should prefer discretionary
monetary policy over the timeless perspective. The critical parameter values
obtained in this paper with the simplest version of the New Keynesian model
suggest that { for a number of empirically reasonable combinations of parameters
{ the long-run losses from discretion may be less relevant than previously thought.
Furthermore, the short-run costs in this paper can be interpreted as a lower
bound for the actual costs because they are derived under the assumption of full
credibility of the monetary authority. Incomplete credibility would raise the costs
from commitment even further, since it takes some time until the central bank
can reap the full gains from commitment.
6
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January 20071 Introduction
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that rule-based policy-making can increase
welfare. The timeless perspective proposed by Woodford (1999) represents a
prominent modern form of such a rule in monetary policy analysis. It helps to
overcome not only the traditional in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon
(1983), but also the stabilisation bias, a dynamic loss stemming from cost-push
shocks in the New Keynesian model as described in Clarida et al. (1999). It is,
however, associated with short-run costs that may be larger than the long-run
gains from commitment.
After deriving a formal condition for the superiority of discretion over the timeless
perspective rule, this paper investigates the in°uence of structural and preference
parameters on the performance of monetary policy both under discretion and the
timeless perspective in the sense of Woodford (1999). Discretion gains relatively
to the timeless perspective rule, i.e. the short-run losses become relatively more
important, if the private sector behaves less forward-looking or if the monetary
authority puts a greater weight on output gap stabilisation. For empirically
reasonable values of price stickiness, the relative gain from discretion rises with
stickier prices. A fourth parameter which in°uences the relative gains is the per-
sistence of shocks: Introducing serial correlation into the model only strengthens
the respective relative performance of policies in the situation without serial cor-
relation in shocks. In particular, we show conditions for each parameter, under
which discretion performs strictly better than the timeless perspective rule.
Furthermore, the framework of short-run losses and long-run gains also allows
explaining why an economy that is su±ciently far away from its steady-state
su®ers rather than gains from implementing the timeless perspective rule. In
general, this paper uses unconditional expectations of the loss function as welfare
criterion, in line with most of the literature. The analysis of initial conditions,
however, requires reverting to expected losses conditional on the initial state of
the economy because unconditional expectations of the loss function implicitly
treat the economy's initial conditions as stochastic. Altogether, in the normal
New Keynesian model all conditions for the superiority of discretion need not be
as adverse as one might suspect.
We also introduce an \optimal" timeless policy rule based on Blake (2001), Jensen
and McCallum (2002) and Jensen (2003). While the general in°uence of struc-
tural and preferences parameters on the performance of monetary policy under
this rule is not a®ected, discretion is never better than this rule when evaluated
with unconditional expectations as it is common in the literature on monetary
policy rules. The reason is that this allegedly optimal rule optimally accounts
for the use of unconditional expectations as the welfare criterion. For any time-
less rule, however, initial conditions can be su±ciently adverse to make the rule
7
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inferior to discretion.The following section 2 presents the canonical New Keynesian Model. Section
3.1 explains the relevant welfare criteria. The analytical solution in section 3.2 is
followed by simulation results and a thorough economic interpretation of the per-
formance of policies under discretion and the timeless perspective, while section
3.4 concludes the discussion of Woodford's timeless perspective by looking at the
e®ects of initial conditions. Section 4 introduces the optimal timeless policy rule
and repeats the analysis from section 3.3, whereas section 5 concludes.
2 New Keynesian Model
The New Keynesian or New Neoclassical Synthesis model has become the stan-
dard toolbox for modern macroeconomics. While there is some debate about the
exact functional forms, the standard setup consists of a forward-looking Phillips
curve, an intertemporal IS-curve and a welfare function.1 Following, e.g., Walsh
(2003), the New Keynesian Phillips curve based on Calvo (1983) pricing is given
by
¼t = ¯Et¼t+1 + ®yt + ut (1)
with
® ´
(1 ¡ ³)(1 ¡ ¯³)
³
: (2)
¼t denotes in°ation, Et the expectations operator conditional on information in
period t, yt the output gap, and ut a stochastic shock term that is assumed to
follow a stationary AR(1) process with AR-parameter ½ and innovation variance
¾2. While the output gap refers to the deviation of actual output from natural
or °exible-price output, ut is often interpreted as a cost-push shock term that
captures time-varying distortions from consumption or wage taxation or mark-
ups in ¯rms' prices or wages. It is the source of the stabilisation bias. 0 < ¯ < 1
denotes the (private sector's) discount factor and 0 · ³ < 1 is the constant
probability that a ¯rm is not able to reset its price in period t. A ¯rm's optimal
price depends on current and (for ³ > 0) future real marginal costs, which are
assumed to be proportional to the respective output gap.2 Hence, ³ and ® re°ect
the degree of price rigidity in this model which is increasing in ³ and decreasing
in ®.










1Depending on the purpose of their paper, some authors directly use an instrument rule or
a targeting rule without explicitly maximising some welfare function.
2In (1), the proportionality factor is set equal to 1.
8
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cymaker preferences. We assume zero to be the target values of in°ation and
the output gap, respectively. While the former assumption is included only for
notational simplicity and without loss of generality, the latter is crucial for the
absence of a traditional in°ation bias in the sense of Barro and Gordon (1983).
The New Keynesian model also includes an aggregate demand relationship based
on consumers' intertemporal optimisation in the form of
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ b(Rt ¡ Et¼t+1) + vt; (4)
where Rt is the central bank's interest rate instrument and vt is a shock to
preferences, government spending or the exogenous natural-rate value of output,
for example.3 The parameter b > 0 captures the output gap elasticity with respect
to the real interest rate. Yet, for distinguishing between the timeless-perspective
and the discretionary solution, it is su±cient to assume that the central bank can
directly control ¼t as an instrument. Hence, the aggregate demand relationship
can be neglected below.4
2.1 Model Solutions
If the monetary authority neglects the impact of its policies on in°ation ex-
pectations and reoptimises in each period, it conducts monetary policy under
discretion. This creates both the Barro and Gordon (1983) in°ation bias for pos-
itive output gap targets and the Clarida et al. (1999) stabilisation bias caused by
cost-push shocks. To concentrate on the second source of dynamic losses in this
model, a positive in°ation bias is ruled out by assuming an output gap target of
zero in the loss function (3). Minimising (3) subject to (1) and to given in°ation





t ¡ ¸t(¼t ¡ ¯Et¼t+1 ¡ ®yt ¡ ut) 8 t = 0;1;2;::: : (5)
The ¯rst order conditions
@¤t
@yt
= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0
@¤t
@¼t






3vt is generally referred to as a demand shock. But in this model, yt re°ects the output gap
and not output alone. Hence, shocks to the °exible-price level of output are also included in
vt. See, e.g., Woodford (2003, p. 246).
4Formally, adding (4) as a constraint to the optimisation problems below gives a value of
zero to the respective Lagrangian multiplier.
9
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into account and possesses an exogenous possibility to credibly commit itself
to some future policy, it can minimise the loss function (3) over an enhanced
opportunity set. Hence, the resulting commitment solution must be at least as










t) ¡ ¸t(¼t ¡ ¯¼t+1 ¡ ®yt ¡ ut)
¤
: (7)
This yields as ¯rst order conditions
@¤
@yt
= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0; t = 0;1;2;:::;
@¤
@¼t
= 2¼t ¡ ¸t = 0; t = 0;
@¤
@¼t












yt¡1; t = 1;2;::: : (9)
The commitment solution improves the short-run output/in°ation trade-o® faced
by the monetary authority because short-run price dynamics depend on expec-
tations about the future. Since the authority commits to a history-dependent
policy in the future, it is able to optimally spread the e®ects of shocks over sev-
eral periods. The commitment solution also enables the policy maker to reap the
bene¯ts of discretionary policy in the initial period without paying the price in
terms of higher in°ation expectations, since these are assumed to depend on the
future commitment to (9). Indeed, optimal policy is identical under commitment
and discretion in the initial period. In a recent paper, Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om
(2006) compare the welfare gains from commitment over discretion under di®er-
ent scenarios.
However, the commitment solution su®ers from time inconsistency in two ways:
First, by switching from (9) to (6) in any future period, the monetary author-
ity can exploit given in°ationary expectations and gain in the respective period.
Second, the monetary authority knows at t = 0 that applying the same optimi-
sation procedure (7) in the future implies a departure from today's optimal plan,
a feature McCallum (2003, p. 4) calls \strategic incoherence".
To overcome the second form of time inconsistency and thus gain true credibility,
many authors since Woodford (1999) have proposed the concept of policy-making
under the timeless perspective: The optimal policy in the initial period should
10
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date far in the past, not exploiting given in°ationary expectations in the initial








yt¡1; t = 0;1;::: : (10)
Hence, the only di®erence to the commitment solution lies in the di®erent policy
in the initial period, unless the economy starts from its steady-state with y¡1 = 0.6
But since the commitment solution is by de¯nition optimal for (7), this di®erence
causes a loss of the timeless perspective policy compared to the commitment
solution. If this loss is greater than the gain from the commitment solution
(COM) over discretion, rule-based policy making under the timeless perspective
(TP) causes larger losses than policy under discretion (DIS):
LTP ¡ LCOM > LDIS ¡ LCOM , LTP > LDIS: (11)
The central aim of the rest of this paper is to compare the losses from TP and
DIS.
2.2 Minimal state variable (MSV) solutions
Before we are able to calculate the losses under the di®erent policy rules, we need
to determine the particular equilibrium behaviour of the economy, which is given
by the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1)7 and the respective policy rule, i.e. DIS
(6) or TP (10). Following McCallum (1999), the minimal state variable (MSV)
solution to each model represents the rational expectations solution that excludes
bubbles and sunspots.
Under discretion, ut is the only relevant state variable in (1) and (6)





so the conjectured solution is of the form
¼t;DIS = Á1ut
yt;DIS = Á2ut:
5Woodford (1999) compares this \commitment" to the \contract" under John Rawls' veil
of uncertainty.
6Due to the history-dependence of (10), the di®erent initial policy has some in°uence on the
losses in subsequent periods, too.
7Without loss of generality but to simplify the notation, the MSV solutions are derived
based on (1) without reference to (2). The de¯nition of ® in (2) is substituted into the MSV
solutions for the simulation results in section 3.3.
11
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 717
January 2007Since Et¼t+1 = Á1½ut in this case, the MSV solution is given by
¼t;DIS =
!
!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2ut (12)
yt;DIS =
¡®
!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2ut: (13)
Under the timeless perspective, yt¡1 and ut are the relevant state variables from
(1) and (10):








Hence, the conjectured solution becomes
¼t;TP = Á11yt¡1 + Á12ut (14)
yt;TP = Á21yt¡1 + Á22ut: (15)






° ¡ ¯(½ + ±)
ut (16)
yt;TP = ±yt¡1 ¡
®
!(° ¡ ¯(½ + ±))
ut: (17)
with ° ´ 1 + ¯ + ®2




2¯ . Given these MSV solutions, we are now
able to evaluate the relative performance of monetary policy under discretion and
the timeless perspective rule.
3 Policy Evaluation
3.1 Welfare criteria
Unconditional expectations: The standard approach to evaluate monetary
policy performance is to compare average values for the period loss function,
i.e. values of the unconditional expectations of the period loss function in (3),
denoted as E[L].9 We follow this approach for the analysis of the in°uence of
preference and structural parameters mainly because it is very common in the
8 These calculations include a quadratic equation in Á21, of which only one root, 0 < ± < 1,
is relevant according to both the stability and MSV criteria.
9The unconditional expectations of the period loss function Lt are equal to the unconditional
expectations of the total loss function L in (3), scaled down by the factor (1 ¡ ¯).
12
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assumptions.
First, ¼t and yt need to be covariance-stationary. This is not a problem in our
setup since ut is stationary by assumption and 0 < ± < 1 is chosen according to
the stability criterion, see footnote 8. Second, using unconditional expectations
of (3) implies treating the initial conditions as stochastic (see, e.g., King and
Wolman, 1999, p.377) and thus averages over all possible initial conditions. Third,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Dennis (2004, Appendix A) show that the
standard approach is formally correct only for lim¯ ! 1, the central bank's
discount factor being close to 1. This may in°uence the precise parameter values
for which DIS performs better than TP in section 3.3, but it only strengthens
the general argument with respect to the in°uence of ¯ as will be shown below.
Conditional expectations: At the same time, using unconditional expectations
impedes an investigation of the e®ects of speci¯c initial conditions and transitional
dynamics to the steady state on the relative performance of policy rules. For this
reason and to be consistent with the microfoundations of the New Keynesian
model, Kim and Levin (2005), Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2005) and
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004) argue in favour of conditional expectations as
the relevant welfare criterion. If future outcomes are discounted, i.e. ¯ < 1, the
use of conditional expectations, i.e. L in (3) as welfare criterion, implies that
short-run losses from TP become relatively more important to the long-run gains
compared to the evaluation with unconditional expectations.
Both concepts can be used to evaluate the performance of monetary policy under
varying parameter values and the results are qualitatively equivalent. Besides its
popularity and analytical tractability, the choice of unconditional expectations as
the general welfare measure has a third advantage: by implicitly averaging over
all possible initial conditions and treating all periods the same, we can evaluate
policies for all current and future periods and thus consider the policy problem
from a \truly timeless" perspective in the sense of Jensen (2003), that does not
bias our results in favour of discretionary policy-making. Only the analysis of the
e®ects of di®erent initial conditions requires reverting to conditional expectations.
3.2 Analytical solution
In principle, the relative performance of DIS and TP can be solved analytically if
closed form solutions for the unconditional expectations of the period loss function
are available. This is possible, since




t;i]; i 2 fDIS; TPg (18)
10See, e.g., various articles in the conference volume by Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al.
(1999), Woodford (1999), Jensen and McCallum (2002).
13
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ances E[¼2
t;i] and E[y2
t;i]. The MSV solution under discretion, (12) and (13) with
ut as the only state variable and E[u2
t] = 1




!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2
¸2 1




!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2
¸2 1




[!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (19)
For the timeless perspective, the MSV solution (16) and (17) depends on two state






















t] + 2Á21Á22E[yt¡1ut]: (20)
These two equations are solved and plugged into (18) in Appendix A. The result
is
LTP =
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (21)
Hence, discretion is superior to the timeless perspective rule, if
LDIS < LTP ,
!(! + ®2)
[!(1 ¡ ¯½) + ®2]2 <
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2
, RL ´ LTP=LDIS ¡ 1 > 0: (22)
(22) allows analytical proofs of several intuitive arguments: First, the variance of
cost-push shocks 1
1¡½2 ¾2 a®ects the magnitude of absolute losses in (19) and (21),
but has no e®ect on the relative loss RL because it cancels out in (22). Second,
economic theory states that with perfectly °exible prices, i.e. ³ = 0 and ® ! 1,
respectively, the short-run Phillips curve is vertical at yt = 0. In this case, the
short-run output/in°ation trade-o® and hence the source of the stabilisation bias
disappears completely and no di®erence between DIS, COM and TP can exist.
Third, if the society behaves as an \in°ation nutter" (King, 1997) and only cares
about in°ation stabilisation, i.e. ! = 0, in°ation deviates from the target value
neither under discretion nor under rule-based policy-making. This behaviour
eliminates the stabilisation bias because the e®ect of shocks cannot be spread over
several periods. Shocks always enter the contemporaneous output gap completely.
Furthermore, the initial conditions do not matter, since y¡1 receives a weight of
0 in (10) and no short-run loss arises. The last two statements are summarised
in the following proposition.
14
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2. in°ation nutter - preferences.
Proof:
1. lim®!1 RL = 0.
2. lim!!0 RL = 0.
Finally, proposition 2 states that discretion is not always inferior to Woodford's
timeless perspective. If the private sector discounts future developments at a
larger rate, i.e. ¯ decreases, ¯rms care less about optimal prices in the future,
when they set their optimal price today. Hence, the potential to use future policies
to spread the e®ects of a current shock via the expectations channel decreases.
Therefore, the loss from the stabilisation bias under DIS, where this potential is
not exploited, i.e. the long-run gains LDIS ¡ LCOM, also decreases with smaller
¯, while the short-run costs from TP, LTP ¡LCOM, remain una®ected under rule
(10). In the extreme case of ¯ = 0, expectations are irrelevant in the Phillips
curve (1) and the source of the stabilisation bias disappears. If the reduction in
the long-run gain is su±ciently large, conditions (11) and (22) are ful¯lled.
Proposition 2 There exists a discount factor ¯ small enough such that discre-
tion is superior to Woodford's timeless perspective as long as some weight is given
to output stabilisation and prices are not perfectly °exible.
Proof: RL is continuous in ¯ because stability requires 0 · ±;½ < 1. Further-
more, lim¯!0 RL =
[®2+2(1¡½)!+(1+½)!](®2+!)
(®2+2!)[®2+(1¡½)!] ¡ 1 > 0 for ! > 0 ^ ® < 1.
In principle, (22) could be used to look at the in°uence of structural (³;½) and
preference (¯;!) parameters on the relative performance of monetary policy un-
der discretion and the timeless perspective rule more generally.11 Unfortunately,
(22) is too complex to be analytically tractable. Hence, we have to turn to results
from simulations.
3.3 Simulation results
Preference (¯;!) and structural (³;½) parameters in°uence the relative perfor-
mance of monetary policy under discretion and the timeless perspective rule. To
evaluate each e®ect separately, we start from a benchmark model with parameter
values presented in table 1 and then vary each parameter successively.
11Please note that it would be conceptually nonsense to compare one policy over several
values of a preference parameter. Here, however, we always compare two policies (DIS and TP)
holding all preference and structural parameters constant.
15
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Proposition 1 Discretion and Woodford's timeless perspective are equivalent forParameter ¯ ! ³ ® ½
Value 0.99 0.0625 0.8722 0.02 0
Table 1: Parameter values for benchmark model.
If one period in the model re°ects one quarter, the discount factor of ¯ = 0:99
corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 4%. Setting ! = 1=16 implies an
equal weight on the quarterly variances of annualised in°ation and the output
gap. For ¯ = 0:99, ³ = 0:8722 corresponds to ® = 0:02, the value used in Jensen
and McCallum (2002) based on empirical estimates in Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999).12
Discount factor ¯: Figure 1 presents the results for the variation of the dis-
count factor ¯ as the loss from the timeless perspective relative to discretionary
policy, RL. A positive (negative) value of RL means that the loss from the time-
less perspective rule is greater (smaller) than the loss under discretion, while an
increase (decrease) in RL implies a relative gain (loss) from discretion.
[Insert ¯gure 1 about here]
The simulation shows that RL increases with decreasing ¯, i.e. DIS gains relative
to TP, if the private sector puts less weight on the future. This pattern re°ects
proposition 2 in the previous section. Since the expectations channel becomes
less relevant with smaller ¯, the stabilisation bias and thus the long-run gains
from commitment also decrease in ¯, whereas short-run losses remain una®ected.
In particular, DIS becomes superior to TP in the benchmark model for ¯ < 0:839,
but with ! = 1 already for ¯ < 0:975. Di®erentiating between the central bank's
and the private sector's discount factor ¯ as in section 4, when the optimal time-
less policy rule is derived analytically, shows that the latter drives RL because
it enters the Phillips curve, while the former is irrelevant due to the use of un-
conditional expectations as the welfare criterion as discussed in section 3.1. But
since using the unconditional expectations of the loss function gives equal weight
to all periods and hence greater weight to future periods than actually valid for
¯ < 1, this e®ect only strengthens the general argument.
This can be shown with the value of the loss function (3), L = E0
P1
t=0 ¯tLt,
conditional on expectations at t = 0 instead of the unconditional expectations
E[L]. As ¯gure 2 demonstrates, the general impact of ¯ on RL is similar to
¯gure 1.13 The notable di®erence is the absolute superiority of DIS over TP in
our benchmark model, independently of ¯. In order to get a critical value of ¯
12³ and ® are linked through the de¯nition of ® in (2).
13The use of conditional expectations requires setting the initial conditions, i.e. y¡1 and u0,
to speci¯c values. In ¯gure 2, y¡1 = ¡0:01 and u0 = 0.
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model have to be adjusted such that they favour TP, e.g. by reducing ! as
explained below. Hence, ¯gure 2 provides evidence that the use of unconditional
expectations does not bias the results towards lower losses for discretionary policy.
For reasons presented in section 3.1, we focus only on unconditional expectations
from now on.
[Insert ¯gure 2 about here]
Output gap weight !: In Barro and Gordon (1983), the traditional in°ation
bias increases in the weight on the output gap, while the optimal stabilisation
policies are identical both under discretion and under commitment.14 In our
intertemporal model without structural ine±ciences, however, the optimal sta-
bilisation policies are di®erent under DIS and COM/TP. The history-dependence
of TP in (10) improves the monetary authority's short-run output/in°ation trade-
o® in each period because it makes today's output gap enter tomorrow's optimal
policy with the opposite sign, but the same weight !=® in both periods. Hence,
optimal current in°ation depends on the change in the output gap under TP,
but only on the contemporaneous output gap under DIS. This way, rule-based
policy-making eliminates the stabilisation bias and reduces the relative variance
of in°ation and output gap, which is a prominent result in the literature.15
The short-run costs from TP arise because the monetary authority must be tough
on in°ation already in the initial period. These short-run costs increase with
the weight on the output gap !.16 The long-run gains from TP are caused by
the size of the stabilisation bias and the importance of its elimination given
by the preferences in the loss function. Equation (10) shows that increasing !
implies a softer policy on in°ation today, but is followed by a tougher policy
tomorrow. Although the e®ect of tomorrow's policy is discounted by the private
sector with ¯, the size of the stabilisation bias, i.e. the neglection of the possibility
to spread shocks over several periods, appears to be largely independent from !.
However, the reduction in the relative variance of in°ation due to TP becomes
less important the larger the weight on the variance of the output gap in the
loss function, i.e. the long-run gains from TP decrease in !. Since short-run
costs increase and long-run gains decrease in the weight on the output gap (! "),
a larger preference for output gap stabilisation favours DIS relative to TP for
reasonable ranges of parameters.
14In Barro and Gordon (1983), a larger ! increases the marginal utility of higher in°ation.
Under discretion, the marginal utility of higher in°ation must equal its marginal cost such
that the ex ante expected policy is also ex post optimal on average, which leaves the optimal
stabilisation policy una®ected.
15See, e.g., Woodford (1999) and Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om (2006).
16The optimal output gap yt under DIS is decreasing in !, see equation (6).
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! ".17 But for reasonable values of !, i.e. ! > 0:0009 in the benchmark model,
RL increases in the preference for output stabilisation and becomes even positive
for ! > 5:28.18
[Insert ¯gure 3 about here]
Price rigidity ³: Proposition 1 states that DIS and TP are equivalent for
perfectly °exible prices, i.e. ³ = 0 or ® ! 1, respectively. Increasing price
rigidity, i.e. increasing ³, has two e®ects: First, ¯rms' price-setting becomes more
forward-looking because they have less opportunities to adjust their prices. This
e®ect favours TP over DIS for ³ " because TP optimally incorporates forward-
looking expectations. Second, more rigid prices imply a °atter Phillips curve
and thus the requirement of TP to be tough on in°ation already in the initial
period becomes more costly. Hence, the left-handside of (11), the short-run losses
from TP over DIS, increases. Figure 4 demonstrates that for ³ > 0:436, the
second e®ect becomes more important, and for ³ > 0:915, the second e®ect even
dominates the ¯rst.19
[Insert ¯gure 4 about here]
Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) provide evidence that empirically reasonable estimates
for price rigidity lie within ® 2 [0:01;0:05], i.e. ³ 2 [0:909;0:804]. In this range,
¯gure 5 shows that RL increases with the ¯rms' probability of not being able to
reset their price, ³, and exceeds 0 for ³ > 0:915 or ® < 0:009.
[Insert ¯gure 5 about here]
Correlation of shocks ½: The analysis of the in°uence of serial correlation
in cost push shocks, ½, is more complex. LDIS exceeds LTP in the benchmark
model with ½ = 0 and raising ½ ceteris paribus strengthens the advantage of TP
as demonstrated in ¯gure 6. If shocks become more persistent, their impact on
future outcomes increases and thus TP gains relative to DIS because it accounts
for these e®ects in a superior way. The long-run gains from TP dominate its
short-run losses and RL decreases with ½.
17Note the magnifying glass in ¯gure 3.
18RL may approach 0 again for ! ! 1, the (unreasonable) case of an \employment nutter".
19Since the relationship between ³ and ® given by equation (2) also depends on ¯, there is a
qualitatively irrelevant and quantitatively negligible di®erence between varying the probability
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However, the relationship between ½ and RL is not independent of the other
parameters in the model, while the relationships between RL and ¯;³ and !,
respectively, appear to be robust to alternative speci¯cations of other parameters.
Broadly speaking, as long as LDIS > LTP for ½ = 0, varying ½ results in a diagram
similar to ¯gure 6, i.e. LDIS > LTP for all ½ 2 [0;1) and RL decreases in ½. If,
however, due to an appropriate combination of ¯;³ and !, LDIS · LTP for ½ = 0,
a picture symmetric to the horizontal axis in ¯gure 6 emerges, as shown in ¯gure
7.20 That means that a higher degree of serial correlation only strengthens the
dominance of either TP or DIS already present without serial correlation. Hence,
serial correlation on its own seems not to be able to overcome the result of the
trade-o® between short-run losses and long-run gains from TP implied by the
other parameter values.21
[Insert ¯gure 7 about here]
3.4 E®ects of initial conditions
As argued in section 3.1, we have to use conditional expectations of L in 3 in
order to investigate the e®ects of the initial conditions, i.e. the previous output
gap y¡1 and the current cost-push shock u0 on the relative performance of policy
rules. Figure 8 presents the relative loss c RL = LTP=LDIS ¡1 conditional on y¡1
and u0.
[Insert ¯gure 8 about here]
Starting from the steady state with y¡1 = u0 = 0 where c RL = ¡0:0666 in the
benchmark model,22 increasing the absolute value of the initial lagged output
gap jy¡1j increases the short-run cost from following TP instead of DIS and
leaves long-run gains una®ected: While ¼0;DIS = y0;DIS = 0 from (12) and (13),
¼0;TP and y0;TP deviate from their target values as can be seen from the history-
dependence of (10) or the MSV solution (16) and (17). Hence, TP becomes
suboptimal under conditional expectations for su±ciently large jy¡1j. Note also
that this short-run cost is of course symmetric to the steady-state value y¡1 = 0.
20For parameter combinations that result in LDIS in the neighbourhood of LTP for ½ = 0,
increasing ½ has hardly any in°uence on RL, but for high degrees of serial correlation from
about ½ > 0:8, RL increases rapidly.
21This shows that the results in McCallum and Nelson (2004, p. 48), who only report the
relationship visible in ¯gure 6, do not hold in general.
22Here, I have set ! = 1=16, implying an equal weight on the quarterly variance of the output
gap and the annualised in°ation rate.
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absolute losses both under DIS and TP increase. Since TP allows an optimal
combination of the short-run cost from TP, the inclusion of jy¡1j > 0 in (10),
with the possibility to spread the impact of the initial shock ju0j > 0 over several
periods, a larger shock u0 alleviates the short-run cost from TP. Hence, the
relative loss c RL from TP decreases in ju0j for any given jy¡1j > 0.
However, this e®ect is the weaker the closer jy¡1j is to 0, as can be seen from the
less bent contour lines in ¯gure 8. If y¡1 = 0, the size of ju0j has no in°uence
on c RL any more since DIS and TP do not di®er in t = 0.23 In this case, c RL
is parallel to the u0-axis. While u0 still in°uences the absolute loss-values L
under both policies and how these losses are spread over time under TP, it has
no in°uence on the relative gain from TP as measured by c RL, which is solely
determined by the long-run gains from TP for y¡1 = 0.
Note that RL is symmetric both to y¡1 = 0 for any given u0 and to u0 = 0 for any
given y¡1. Under DIS, y¡1 has no impact because (6) is not history-dependent
and u0 only in°uences the respective period loss L0, which is the weighted sum
of the variances ¼2
0 and y2
0. Hence, LDIS is independent of y¡1 and symmetric to
u0 = 0.
Under TP, however, the history-dependence of (9) makes y¡1 and u0 in°uence
current and future losses. While the transitional dynamics di®er with the relative
sign of u0 and y¡1, the total absolute loss LTP does not for any given combination
of jy¡1j and ju0j. If the economy was in a recession (y¡1 < 0), for example,24 the
price to pay under TP is to decrease ¼0 through dampening y0. In ¯gure 9, the
shift of the steady-state aggregate demand curve AD¤ to AD0 re°ects this policy
response.
[Insert ¯gure 9 about here]
Scenario 1: If additionally a negative cost-push shock u0 < 0 hits the economy,
i.e. with the same sign as y¡1 < 0, this shock lowers ¼0 further as the Phillips
curve (1) is shifted downwards from its steady-state locus AS¤ to AS0
0 in ¯gure
9. At the same time, u0 < 0 increases y0 ceteris paribus,25 brings y0 closer to
the target of 0 and thus reduces the price to pay for TP in the next periods
23To be precise, the policy \rules" (6) and (10) do not di®er in t = 0, but the losses di®er
because of the more favourable output-in°ation trade-o® through the impact of TP on E0¼1 in
(1). This bene¯t of TP is part of the long-run gains, however, because it is also present under
COM.
24The following arguments run in a completely analogous manner for y¡1 > 0.
25Formally, partial derivatives of (16) and (17) with respect to both state variables (yt¡1;ut)
show that both have the same qualitative e®ect on ¼t and an opposing e®ect on yt: @¼t=@yt¡1 =
!(1¡±)
® > 0 and @¼t=@ut = 1
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E0¼1 compared to the steady-state and thus shifts AS0
0 even further down. B
denotes the resulting equilibrium in ¯gure 9 and is always closer to the ¼0-axis
than A.
Scenario 2: If, however, the initial cost-push shock u0 is positive, i.e. of opposite
sign to y¡1 < 0, the transitional dynamics are reversed. The Phillips curve (1) is
shifted upwards to AS00
0 in ¯gure 9. In contrast to scenario 1 with u0 < 0, this
reduces the negative impact of y¡1 on ¼0 but increases y0 to point C. Hence,
the price to pay under TP in t = 1 is larger than in scenario 1, which in turn
also lowers in°ation expectations E0¼1 by more. The additional shift of AS00
0
downwards is thus larger than for u0 < 0 and the new equilibrium is at point D.
Figure 10 presents the discounted period losses under TP for both cases in the
benchmark model. The behaviour of the economy as described above causes a
larger loss in the initial period for the ¯rst scenario with sign(y¡1) = sign(u0)
compared to the case with sign(y¡1) = ¡sign(u0) because the expectations chan-
nel has a smaller impact, but a reversal of the magnitude of losses for t ¸ 1
because the price to pay for TP then is larger until the period loss converges to
its unconditional value. Since the sum of the discounted losses, however, is equal
in both scenarios, LTP is symmetric to u0 = 0 given y¡1 and to y¡1 = 0 given u0.
[Insert ¯gure 10 about here]
To summarise, Figure 8 presents the in°uences of the initial conditions on the
relative performance of TP and DIS and the rest of this section provides intuitive
explanations of the e®ects present in the model. c RL becomes positive, i.e. DIS
performs better than TP, in the benchmark model for quite realistic values of the
initial conditions, e.g. c RL > 0 for jy¡1j = 0:015 and ju0j = 0:01. Hence, it may
not be welfare increasing for an economy to switch from DIS to TP if it is not
close to its steady state.
4 Optimal timeless policy rule
So far, we have compared policy under discretion and under the timeless per-
spective rule in the sense of Woodford (1999). The latter appears to be the most
common \optimal" rule in the recent literature on monetary policy. However, as
noted in the introduction, several authors have already mentioned that TP is not
always an optimal rule - without providing an analysis of the in°uence of di®erent
parameters on the performance of TP and without an intuitive interpretation of
their result, the main objectives of our paper. In particular, Blake (2001) and
Jensen (2003) derive the optimal timeless policy (OP) based on the unconditional
21
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Starting from the root of the problem, however, and di®erentiating between the
monetary authority's discount factor ¯MA, at which the intertemporal losses in
(3) are discounted, and the private sector's discount factor ¯PS, that enters the
New Keynesian Phillips curve (1), allow further insights. The intertemporal












t) ¡ ¸t(¼t ¡ ¯PS¼t+1 ¡ ®yt ¡ ut)
¤
: (24)
This yields as ¯rst order conditions
@¤
@yt
= 2!yt + ®¸t = 0; t = 0;1;2;:::;
@¤
@¼t
= 2¼t ¡ ¸t = 0; t = 0;
@¤
@¼t














yt¡1; t = 1;2;::: : (26)
Again, the timeless perspective requires neglecting (25) and applying (26) in all
periods. We know from the discussion in section 3.1 and Dennis (2004, Appendix
A) that using the \truly timeless" perspective with unconditional expectations
implicitly sets ¯MA = 1. Hence, the optimal timeless rule by Blake (2001) and








This rule causes a loss under unconditional expectations of
LOP =
![1 ¡ ´2 + (¯PS ¡ ´)2] + ®2
!(1 ¡ ´2)(» ¡ ¯PS´)2 ¢ ¾
2; (28)
26Recall that Blake (2001) and Jensen (2003) cannot account for the di®erence between ¯PS
and ¯MA because they optimise over unconditional expectations of the loss function.
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PS + ®2





2¯PS and ½ = 0 for simplicity.
Performing simulations analogous to the ones in section 3.3, but with the optimal
timeless rule (27) instead of (10) and f RL ´ LOP=LDIS ¡ 1, gives graphs with
similar patterns to the respective ¯gures in section 3.3. The critical di®erence is
that f RL never becomes positive for any parameter combinations (see ¯gures 11
to 15), even for ¯gure 7, where RL is positive, but f RL negative for all ½.27 This
suggests that as long as the private sector is not completely myopic28 and some
weight is given to output stabilisation and prices are not perfectly °exible, the
inclusion of ¯PS in the optimal policy rule (27) is superior to DIS from a truly
timeless perspective.29 The optimal policy rule reduces its reaction to the lagged
output gap in all periods and thus optimally accounts for the decreasing potential
to use future policies to spread the e®ects of a current shock both in the initial
and future periods, given that the future is not discounted in the welfare function
(¯MA = 1). The reason is that (27) reduces the weight on yt¡1 by ¯PS whereby
today's output gap receives exactly the same weight in tomorrow's policy with
which the private sector discounts tomorrow's policy today.30
[Insert ¯gures 11 to 15 about here]
Hence, the inclusion of ¯PS optimally accounts for the use of unconditional ex-
pectations as the welfare criterion. But the general argument, that the relative
performance of policy-making under the timeless perspective and discretion re-
°ects the trade-o® between short-run losses and long-run gains in (11), remains
valid for two reasons: First, the general pattern of the parameter in°uences is
not a®ected by OP. Second, the in°uence of initial conditions on the relative per-
formance is alleviated, but still present in the benchmark model with ¯ = 0:99
as can be seen in ¯gure 16, which plots c RL as in ¯gure 8, but with OP instead
of TP compared to DIS.
[Insert ¯gure 16 about here]
27Here, LDIS ¸ LOP for ½ = 0 with any combination of parameters, and increasing ½ only
aggravates this situation.
28For a completely myopic private sector, i.e. ¯PS = 0, the optimal timeless rule causes a loss
equivalent to the one under discretion because equations (6) and (23) are identical for ¯PS = 0.
Hence, there is no equivalent to Proposition 2 for OP.
29An analytical proof of this result could be given as follows: Since lim¯PS!0 LOP = LDIS
and dLOP
d¯ < 0 for 0 < ¯ · 1, while dLDIS
d¯ = 0, LOP < LDIS for 0 < ¯ · 1. But dLOP
d¯ is too






30Recall also the discussion of the in°uence of ¯ and ! in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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This paper explores the theoretical implications of di®erent policy rules and dis-
cretionary policy under varying parameters in the New Keynesian model. With
the comparison of short-run gains from discretion over rule-based policy and
long-run losses from discretion, we have provided a framework in which to think
about the impact of di®erent parameters on monetary policy rules versus dis-
cretion. This framework allows intuitive economic explanations of the e®ects at
work.
Already Blake (2001), Jensen and McCallum (2002) and Jensen (2003) provide
evidence that a policy rule following the timeless perspective can cause larger
losses than purely discretionary modes of monetary policy making in special cir-
cumstances. But none of these contributions considers an economic explanation
for this rather unfamiliar result let alone analyses the relevant parameters as
rigorously as this paper.
What recommendations for economic policy making can be derived? Most im-
portantly, the timeless perspective in its standard formulation is not optimal for
all economies at all times. In particular, if an economy is characterised by rigid
prices, a low discount factor, a high preference for output stabilisation or a su±-
ciently large deviation from its steady state, it should prefer discretionary mone-
tary policy over the timeless perspective. The critical parameter values obtained
in this paper suggest that { for a number of empirically reasonable combinations
of parameters { the long-run losses from discretion may be less relevant than
previously thought.
In an overall laudatory review of Woodford (2003), Walsh (2005) argues that
Woodford's book "will be widely recognized as the de¯nitive treatise on the new
Keynesian approach to monetary policy". He critisises the book, however, for
its lack of an analysis of the potential short-run costs of adopting the timeless
perspective rule. Walsh (2005) sees these short-run costs arising from incomplete
credibility of the central bank. Our analysis has completely abstracted from such
credibility e®ects and still found potentially signi¯cant short-run costs from the
timeless perspective. Obviously, if the private sector does not fully believe in the
monetary authority's commitment, the losses from sticking to a rule relative to
discretionary policy are even greater than in the model used in this paper. One
way to incorporate such issues is to assume that the private sector has to learn
the monetary policy rule. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a convenient
framework to analyse this question in more detail.
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Figure 1: Variation of discount factor ¯, TP vs. DIS.















Figure 2: Variation of discount factor ¯ using conditional expectations of loss
function, TP vs. DIS.
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Figure 4: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³, TP vs. DIS.
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Figure 5: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³, TP vs. DIS.

















Working Paper Series No 717






































Figure 8: c RL depending on y¡1 and u0.
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Figure 10: Discounted per-period loss values LTP;t for jy¡1j = 0:02 and ju0j =
0:01.











Figure 11: Variation of discount factor ¯, OP vs. DIS.
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Figure 12: Variation of weight on the output gap !, OP vs. DIS.









Figure 13: Variation of degree of price rigidity ³, OP vs. DIS.
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Figure 14: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½, OP vs. DIS.















Figure 15: Variation of degree of serial correlation ½ with ! = 10, OP vs. DIS.
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Figure 16: c RL =
LOP
LDIS depending on y¡1 andu0.
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The unconditional loss for the timeless perspective, equation (21), can be derived
in several steps. The MSV solution (16) and (17) depends on two state variables,











t] + 2Á21Á22E[yt¡1ut]: (29)
E[yt¡1ut] can be calculated from (15) with ut = ½ut¡1 + ² as
E[yt¡1ut] = E[(Á21yt¡2 + Á22(½ut¡2 + ²t¡1))(½ut¡1 + ²t)]
= E[Á21½ yt¡2ut¡1 | {z }
=E[yt¡1ut]
+Á22(½
2 ut¡1ut¡2 | {z }
=½¾2
u
+½ut¡1²t¡1 | {z }
=¾2
)] + 3 ¢ 0; (30)
since the white noise shock ²t is uncorrelated with anything from the past. Solving








1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (31)
Plugging this into (29), using E[y2
t] = E[y2




















!2(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (32)











t] + 2Á11Á12E[yt¡1ut]: (33)




(1 + ±)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
1 ¡ ½2 ¾
2: (34)
Hence, LTP as the weighted sum of E[¼2] and E[y2] is given by
LTP =
2!(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½) + ®2(1 + ±½)
!(1 ¡ ±2)(1 ¡ ±½)[° ¡ ¯(± + ½)]2 ¢
1
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